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This article deals with the clash between the European and American approach to
transborder data flows. In the last decades, the discourse has been that the U.S. offers a
market-dominated approach while the EU was embedded in a right-dominated policy.
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) restricts data transfers outside the EU. An
analysis of the meaning of the level of adequate protection of a non-EU country is
necessary to transfer data beyond the EU. The Court of Justice of the European Union has
invalidated the Privacy Shield agreement to transfer commercial data from the European
Union to the United States, leaving transatlantic data transfers in a current predicament.
Safe Harbour Principles previously and Privacy Shield recently have been read according
to EU data protection law, in particular the General Data Protection Regulation in
combination with the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. The landmark Schrems II
judgement is assessed to point out current available options to transfer data from the
European Union to the United States and also several implications on cross-border data
flows beyond the EU-U.S. relationship.
Keywords: data protection – privacy – international commerce – surveillance –
fundamental rights – international data transfers

*

RCC Postdoctoral Fellow at the Harvard Law School Institute for Global Law and Policy.
PhD in Law Complutense University (Madrid). LL.M. College of Europe (Brugge).
1

2021

Cross-Border Data Transfers Between the EU and the U.S.

19:2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

A CONFLICT OF CULTURES: A CONFLICT OF VALUES................................................ 3
A.

Dependence on Personal Data .............................................................................. 3

B.

The United States Model ...................................................................................... 8

C.

The Effects Doctrine: The European Union Model.............................................. 9

D.

The Liberal Governance Model .......................................................................... 11

II.

GDPR OPTIONS ....................................................................................................... 12
A.
i.

Obtaining an Adequacy Decision ....................................................................... 12
International Commitments ............................................................................ 13

ii.

Adequacy Decisions are not Immune to Legal Challenges ............................ 14

iii. The Safe Harbour Principles .......................................................................... 15

B.

iv.

The EU Charter Significance ......................................................................... 18

v.

The Surveillance Matter ................................................................................. 21

Standard Contractual Clauses ............................................................................. 23
i. A Contractual Alternative ............................................................................... 23
ii.

Obligations on Private Parties ....................................................................... 25

III. PRIVACY SHIELD: SOLUTION TO A TRADE CONFLICT .............................................. 28
A.

Surveillance Interference: A Problem Not Solved ............................................. 28

B.
i.

Absence of Compatibility Between U.S. and EU Law....................................... 31
Previous Uncertainty Concerning Compatibility ........................................... 31

ii.

The Schrems II Ruling: The Proportionality Principle .................................. 34

i.

Lack of Effective Legal Remedies ..................................................................... 37
U.S. Law Developments Does Not Affect Surveillance .................................. 37

ii.

Lack of Independence of the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson ......................... 39

C.

D.

No Legal Vacuum: Reduced Alternatives .......................................................... 40

E.

Further Consequences of Invalidating International Agreements ...................... 41

IV. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 44

2

2021
I.

Santa Clara Journal of International Law

19:2

A CONFLICT OF CULTURES: A CONFLICT OF VALUES
A. Dependence on Personal Data
All industries depend on data flows, from traditional industries to
cutting edge technologies. Economic growth is determined by industries
development and business growth, for which free data flow is a fundamental
support.1 The European Union was aware that the digital economy within the
EU itself relies on data transfers.
The transatlantic economic relationship between the EU and the
United States is the largest in the world, valued at $7.1 trillion. 2 The Data
Protection Directive (Directive 45/95, today repealed)3 was viewed as “[t]he
most significant potential barrier to transatlantic data flows.” 4 Compatibility
between divergent frameworks does not sound an easy task. Too much
protection can overly restrict business activities and trade, but too little
protection can create negative market effects affecting consumer trust.
The process of harmonization inside the EU was based on free flow of
personal data to foster growth, but at the same time the level of protection of
personal data increased with the adoption of Directive 45/95, as many
Member States did not previously have a data protection regime. Within the
framework of the aim of creating a market Union, data flows could not be an
impediment within the EU. EU legal regimes have crossed European borders
when third states decided to regulate data protection considering the EU legal
regime as a model.5 Recital 10 of the General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR) specifically refers to ensure a high level of protection of natural

1

See Daniel Castro & Alan Mcquinn, Cross-Border Data Flows Enable Growth in All
Industries, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (Feb. 2015), http://www2.itif.org/2015cross-border-data-flows.pdf.
2
See Press Release, Department of Commerce, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross
Statement on Schrems II Ruling and the Importance of EU-U.S. Data Flows (July 16,
2020), https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2020/07/us-secretary-commercewilbur-ross-statement-schrems-ii-ruling-and.
3
Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data, O.J. (L 281) [hereinafter Data Protection Directive].
4
See Joshua P. Meltzer, Examining the EU Safe Harbor Decision and Impacts for
Transatlantic Data Flows, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.brookings.e
du/testimonies/examining-the-eu-safe-harbor-decision-and-impacts-for-transatlantic-dataflows/.
5
See Graham Greenleaf, ‘European’ Data Privacy Standards Implemented in Laws Outside
Europe, 149 PRIVACY LAWS & BUS. INT’L REP. 1 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.co
m/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3096314 (14 of 20 GDPR countries selected outside Europe
have restrictions on data exports based at least in part on the laws of the recipient country).
3
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persons plus to remove obstacles of data flows throughout the EU. 6 Therefore,
the GDPR establishes free flow of personal data in the geographical space of
the EU (and EEA).7 Some scholars even go further suggesting that data flows
should be the fifth freedom of the internal market.8 The GDPR model is within
the framework of a particular international organization with aims of political
union.
However, the external dimension of data flows is uneven. The EU
regime proposes restrictions of data flows to third States to ensure that the
level of protection of natural persons is not undermined. 9 Article 44 of the
Regulation prohibits the transfer of personal data to countries outside EU
borders, unless the recipient country can provide evidence of an adequate
level of data protection equivalent to the EU.
By contrast, U.S. law does not require a national regulator to approve
a data transfer agreement.10 This has practical implications, considering the
market power of U.S. companies in online services. For example, tech giants,
like Google and Facebook admitted access to personal information. 11 The
United States is one of the non-European countries in the G20 that does not
have data privacy laws meeting this minimum international standard referring
to the OECD standards.12 As Professor Lessig highlighted, “[t]he problem
6

Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data
Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1.
7
See General Data Protection Regulation art. 1(3) [hereinafter GDPR]. The principle of free
movement of data within the Union for non-personal is established in Regulation (EU)
2018/1807, subject to restrictions on public security reasons. See Regulation (EU)
2018/1807, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 November 2018 on a
Framework for the Free Flow of Non-Personal Data in the European Union, 2018 O.J. (L
303) 59; see also PEDRO A. DE MIGUEL ASENSIO, CONFLICTS OF LAWS AND THE INTERNET
128 (2020).
8
See OLIVIER LINDEN & ERIK DAHLBERG, KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM NAT’L BD. OF TRADE
SWEDEN, DATA FLOWS – A FIFTH FREEDOM FOR THE INTERNAL MARKET?, 25-29 (2016),
https://www.kommerskollegium.se/globalassets/publikationer/ rapporter/2016/publ-dataflows.pdf.
9
See GDPR, supra note 7, arts. 44-50.
10
There are no specifications in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. The California Security
Breach Notifications Law and the California Online Privacy Protection Act does not
address the use of data transfer agreement. Although a regulator may have audit powers to
ensure compliance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, there is no
need to approve a data transfer agreement.
11
Samuel Gibbs, Gmail Does Scan All Emails, New Google Terms Clarify, THE GUARDIAN
(Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/apr/15/gm
ail-scans-all-emails-new-google-terms-clarify.
12
Greenleaf, supra note 5, at 2. (China, Brasil and Saudi Arabia are part of the G-20 that do
not have privacy laws meeting OECD standards. Only 4 countries of the 13 non-European
countries in the G20 are in this category).
4
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with privacy is that private data flows too easily–that it too easily falls out of
the control of the individual.”13 According to the property perspective, privacy
tools will be more developed if users would pay for protecting privacy. In a
comparison with copyright, copyright holders (such as Hollywood industry in
the U.S.) pay to get protection.14 Privacy may not be as well as protected as
copyright because the American society does not “invoke the rhetoric of
property to defend incursions into privacy.” 15
Protecting data privacy means not only limiting access to personal
information, so that citizens maintain the right to information they want to
display about themselves, data protection cares about that data flows
appropriately.16 How is the level of appropriateness regulated? This article
deals with the clash between the European and American approach to
transborder data flows. In the last decades, the discourse has been that the U.S.
offers a market-dominated approach while the EU was embedded in a rightdominated policy.17 Both systems are converging, maybe at a slow pace, and
mutual regulatory influences are acknowledged at least at a substantive level.
The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)18 was influenced by the
GDPR, but the GDPR has also been inspired by the California law on data
notification breaches (see arts. 32-34 GDPR). 19 The EU Commission
encouraged the National Telecommunication and Information Administration
of the U.S. Department of Commerce to consider reporting data breaches for
harmonization at a federal level, instead only at state level. 20 This was also
recognized in the “Data Protection and Privacy Agreement” or “DPPA” for
law enforcement purposes in criminal matters (Article 10). 21
In the last years we have observed an increase in people’s concern
related to global phenomena, such as Snowden revelations (2013) or

13

Lawrence Lessig, Privacy as Property, 69 SOCIAL RESEARCH 247, 250 (2002).
Id. at 252.
15
Id. at 255.
16
HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE, 2-3 (Stanford Univ. Press 2010), https://crypto.stanford.ed
u/portia/papers/privacy_in_context.pdf.
17
Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in
Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (1999-2000).
18
California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, Assembly Bill No. 375 (2018),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180AB375.
19
See Paul M. Schwartz, Global Data Privacy: The EU Way, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 771
(2019); Lee A. Bygrave, Transatlantic Tensions on Data Privacy, TRANSWORLD 9 (2013).
20
See Letter from Bruno Gencarelli to Secretary Redl, (Nov. 9, 2018) (Request for public
comments on a proposed approach to consumer privacy [Docket No. 180821780-8780-01]).
21
See Agreement Between the United States of America and the European Union on the
Protection of Personal Information Relating to the Prevention, Investigation, Detection, and
Prosecution of Criminal Offences, 2016 O.J. (L. 336) (in the EU referred to as "Umbrella
Agreement").
14
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Cambridge Analytica scandal (2018).22 The US CONSENT Act,23 the Privacy
Bill of Rights Act,24 and the New Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act
(COPRA)25 were enacted after the Cambridge Analytica scandal. Recently,
the US Public Health Emergency Privacy Act has come into force after the
pandemic of COVID-19.26 The criticism of stuck U.S. privacy law does not
seem to be any more the case. Eleven privacy bills were introduced in the U.S.
Congress and several states are enacting broad legislation. 27
Transfer of personal data abroad is not only a technical problem, it is
rather a legal issue and like every legal issue implicates economic and societal
values. Therefore, a technical solution does not make disappear the problem
of understanding between two different legal viewpoints. Code may solve the
problem of identifiability, but the issue of citizen redress and the ability to
public enforcement when use of data is not in compliance with the law may
only be solved by a legal solution. Diplomats usually work in reaching
agreements with foreign countries and cultures. A political solution may be a
good step to reach a common understanding, however, without a legal
framework where individuals can base their data privacy claims, without the
option of clear (public and private) enforcement, consumers and citizens or
netizens completely lose their rights they had in the off-line world.
Part I explores the different perspectives surrounding data privacy
between the United States and the European Union. The ideology on data
protection (EU terminology) and privacy (U.S. terminology) expands with
regard to international data flows. The extensive jurisdiction of the GDPR is
considered under the effects doctrine. This part also briefly examines the
liberal governance model created under the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development Guidelines. The OECD model reflects a mixed
approach regarding international data flows. Meanwhile it adopts a free flow
data approach in line with the self-regulation and voluntary U.S. model, it also
permits restrictions of international data flows when the recipient country
does not provide equivalent protection.
22

See Julie Carrie Wong, The Cambridge Analytica Scandal Changed the World- But it
Didn’t Change Facebook, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2019),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/mar/17/the-cambridge-analytica-scandalchanged-the-world-but-it-didnt-change-facebook (“It took five full days for the founder and
CEO of Facebook – the man with total control over the world’s largest communications
platform – to emerge from his Menlo Park cloisters and address the public. When he finally
did, he did so with gusto, taking a new set of talking points”).
23
CONSENT Act, S. 2639, 115th Cong. § 2 (2018).
24
Privacy Bill of Rights Act, S. 1214, 116th Cong. (2019).
25
Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2968, 116th Cong. (2019).
26
Public Health Emergency Privacy Act, S. 3749, 116th Cong. (2020).
27
See Anupan Chander, Margot E. Kaminski, & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy
Law, MINN. L. REV. (Apr. 16, 2021), https://minnesotalawreview.org/article/catalyzingprivacy-law/.
6
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Part II turns to the options that the General Data Protection Regulation
allows to transfer data to a non-EU country. Chapter V of the GDPR together
with the first case on Schrems v. Facebook is analyzed. It broadens the lens to
the first jurisprudence from the Court of Justice of the European Union,
considering the particular challenges of adequacy decisions issued by the
European Commission. Moreover, it assesses the importance of international
commitments by the example of the Council of Europe Modernized
Convention 108, to which non-European countries have committed. A
consideration of the meaning between the EU equivalent level of protection
and an appropriate level of protection is necessary to think about the situation
of the United States in the aftermath of the Schrems II decision by the Court
of Justice of the European Union on July 16, 2020. This part remembers the
Commission warnings on the Safe Harbour Principles, predecessor
mechanism of the Privacy Shield to transfer data from the European Union to
the United States. An in-depth analysis of the Court of Justice of the European
Union in Schrems I on 6 October 2015 reveals that the causes for Safe Harbour
Principles invalidation were not commercial, but related to surveillance
matters, which was not assessed by the European Commission during the
negotiations of the first agreement. The study of provisions of the European
Charter of Fundamental Rights in previous cases is key to understanding the
development of the Court of Justice of the European Union reasoning.
Furthermore, the common contractual alternative of standard contractual
clauses is explained, considering the clarifications of the most recent case
Schrems II.
Part III examines the issues of the invalidation of the Privacy Shield
in detail. It contrasts different previous opinions on the compatibility between
the U.S. and EU law. It explains the absence of compatibility between the
United States and the European Union law, considering the specific U.S. laws
which are problematic from a fundamental rights approach, with special
attention to surveillance programmes and their underlying legal basis. The
proportionality principle is expanded to consider non-legal reasons such as
the intelligence collaboration between the United States and the Member
States of the European Union. Specific risks regarding cross border transfers
to the U.S. arise for non-U.S. citizens, in particular the absence of means of
effective redress, despite the improvements of U.S. laws like the FREEDOM
Act and the Judicial Redress Act. Moreover, it also analyzes the significance
of independence of the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson in relation to the
European legal context and previous case. This part includes an explanation
of the current available options to transfer data from the European Union to
the United States and pointing out further consequences for international
agreements beyond the EU-U.S. relationship.
The article concludes with some remarks on why an international
framework is more necessary than ever, considering the surveillance society
in which we are immersed in most parts of the world.

7
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B. The United States Model
The U.S. perspective considers regulation of data flows inappropriate.
The last decade of the twentieth century saw the bursting of e-commerce.
Regulation could hamper the economic prospects of corporations which were
benefiting from the common use of the internet by consumers. The decision
of the U.S. administration seems to balance a set of priorities and tilt to a
flexible and tailored self-regulation. Self-regulation seems a better option than
a comprehensive regulation by the legislature. 28 It exists an intrinsic belief
that companies will provide meaningful and consumer-friendly regimes on its
own.29 The U.S. government publicly supports the private sector initiative on
incorporating privacy safeguards. 30 Regulation of privacy is viewed as risky,
costly and burdensome. The “religion of self-regulation” was also criticized
by American scholars.31
However, the concept of companies towards privacy has changed
substantially.32 Google CEO Sundar Pinchai has stated that Google believes
privacy is a human right at a remote hearing before the U.S. Congress on July
30, 2020.33 The CCPA in California obliges companies to establish new rights
for residents in California. In practical terms, differences between California
law and the rest of the United States are reflected in the privacy policies of
companies operating throughout the United States. An example of the current
legislative fragmentation for a U.S. citizen is the company's warning that even
if someone uninstalls the app from your device, it will still have the unique

28

See Henry Farrell, Negotiating Privacy Across Arenas: The EU-U.S. “Safe Harbor”
Discussions, in COMMON GOODS: REINVENTING EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE 101, 105–26 (Adrienne Héritier ed., 2002).
29
THE WHITE HOUSE, A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce,
https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/Commerce/read.html (last updated
1997).
30
Id.
31
See Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609
(1999); Joel R. Reidenberg & Francoise Gamet-Pol, The Fundamental Role of Privacy and
Confidence in the Network, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105, 113–14 (1995).
32
Compare 1997 Vice President of American Express, “We believe that government
regulation of privacy on the Internet and other online areas is very risky given the rapid
changes in this new technology.” Peggy H. Haney, Case Study of American Express’
Privacy Principles: Why and How They Were Adopted, the Choices Involved and a CostBenefit Analysis, in PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE 209, 213
(U.S. Dep’t of Commerce ed., 1997), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/chapter-6-corporateexperiences-privacy-self-regulation.
33
Tony Romm, Amazon, Apple, Facebook and Google Grilled on Capitol Hill over Their
Market Power, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 29, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/07/29/apple-google-facebook-amazoncongress-hearing/.
8
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associated identifier for the device. However, if U.S. are California residents,
they enjoy some rights, like the right of deletion under the CCPA.
Some privacy policy clauses only warn the user that by using our
websites and mobile applications, you consent to the transfer to, the
processing and storage of your information in, countries outside of your
country of residence, which may have different data protection laws than
those in the country in which you reside. 34 The residence of the user does not
seem the only factor to take into account. Therefore, data gathered by these
websites do not offer the option to consent or opt-out, basically they are
unilateral provisions not able to negotiate by users or consumers with the
handicap that it is not clear at all which law is applicable to the personal data
of the user. It may be absent in the privacy policy the destination of personal
data and any further guidance to the user.
Consequently, self-regulation does not seem an effective way for
transborder data flows. If the policy option is free personal data flows, users
are lost to vindicate their rights because it appears that there is no right to
defend. The last approach contrasts with the protective approach of citizens
endorsed by EU law.
In the past, data protection standards were not in a prominent position
in international negotiation. For example, when discussing free trade
agreements or privacy was not seen a very serious matter compared to other
human rights. However, technology has made the focus on data protection
more significant. The EU-led agreements related to international trade usually
contemplates as a mandatory requirement that international data flows
between both areas are subject to privacy standards forward by the GDPR. 35
By contrast, the U.S. furthers its policy of limitless flow of data across borders
through trade agreements where only a public policy reason can be a limit to
transborder data flows.36
C. The Effects Doctrine: The European Union Model
The connecting factors for the application of the GDPR are offering
goods or services to data subjects in the EU or monitoring their behavior in
34

See e.g., Target privacy policy before July 1, 2020 said: “We are based in the United
States. When we obtain information about you, we may transfer, process, and store such
information in the United States and other countries. By using our websites and mobile
applications, you consent to the transfer to, and to the processing and storage of your
information in, countries outside of your country of residence, which may have different
data protection laws than those in the country in which you reside.” The last up-to-date has
deleted this information (last visited Aug. 16, 2020), https://www.target.com/c/targetprivacy-policy/-/N-4sr7p?Nao=0#ContactTarget.
35
See Adil Nussipov, How America and Europe Deal with Data, CMDS (Jan. 7, 2020),
https://cmds.ceu.edu/article/2020-01-07/how-america-and-europe-deal-data.
36
Id.
9
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the EU, irrespective of location of processing personal data. 37 The targeting
of residents in the EU has been considered an example of the effects doctrine
that permits a State to assert jurisdiction where a regulated conduct produces
significant effects on a territory.38 Data protection is a protective law similar
to consumer protection laws whose objective is preventing negative effects of
conduct targeted to citizens or residents in the European Union. The effects
doctrine could be considered similar to the objective territoriality principle. 39
However, personal data located in the territory of the EU seems to
dictate control, in particular because the GDPR restricts transfer of data
outside the EU without finding appropriate safeguards. 40 The GDPR broadens
its territorial scope beyond the EU under the idea that protecting privacy is a
fundamental right that must continue, disregarding where personal data are
processed. In fact, the legal protection follows the data which has been
included under the personality principle.41 One of the goals of regulating
cross-border data flows is furthering social and economic values, 42 despite
this, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights does not mention regulation of
cross-border data flows while refers to the “essence” of fundamental rights
and freedoms.
The CJEU has confirmed that the high level of protection of natural
persons guaranteed by the GDPR is not undermined abroad,43 in particular,
protection of personal data concerning natural persons that are citizens or
residents in the EU.
If social and economic values in the U.S. and the EU are different
(liberal approach and social protection), we should ask ourselves how
37

Regulation (EU) 2016/679 (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 127),
Article 3(2).
38
The effect test comes from competition law, see Julia Hörnle, Juggling More than Three
Balls at Once: Multilevel Jurisdictional Challenges in EU Data Protection Regulation, 27
INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 142, 164 (2019).
39
Id. at 165.
40
See Jennifer Daskal, Transnational Government Hacking, 10 J. L. NAT’L SEC. L. &
POLICY 677, 682 (2020) (“In restricting the transfers of data outside the EU absent a finding
of adequate data protection safeguards, the EU, for example, presumes that location of data
(whether in or out of the EU) dictates control.”).
41
See CHRISTOPHER KUNER, TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS AND DATA PRIVACY LAW 123
(2013).
42
Id. at 160.
43
See Case C-362/14 Maximilien Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner [2015]
EU:C:2015:650 [hereinafter Schrems I]; Case C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v.
Facebook Ireland Ltd, Maximilien Schrems [2020] EU:C:2020:559 [hereinafter Schrems
II]. See also CJEU, Opinion 1/15, Draft Agreement Between Canada and the European
Union, (July 26, 2017) EU:C:2017:592 (invalidating the Agreement between Canada and
the European Union on the transfer and processing of Passenger Name Record data).

10
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different they are and if it would be possible to further them without conflict.
We should recognize that culture influences on both sides of the Atlantic, and
admit legal pluralism as a viable solution, having taken into account there is
not an international aspiration of becoming a political union. We need to
consider the basis of philosophical values in common such as democracy, the
rule of law, liberty, justice and solidarity in order to propose a more realistic
and effective approach to data flows.
D. The Liberal Governance Model
The liberal governance model has its representation at international
level with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Guidelines (OECD Guidelines).44 The OECD Guidelines governing the
protection of privacy and transborder flows of personal data are voluntary and
focus on “consumers” and “users” instead of “citizens.” 45 OECD recommends
to remove or avoid creating unjustified obstacles to transborder flows of
personal data.46 However, the OECD Guidelines explicitly allows to restrain
data flows where the State does not observe the OECD Guidelines or where
“the re-export of such data would circumvent its domestic privacy
regulations.”47 Moreover, restrictions are allowed with respect to certain
categories of personal data if specific regulations exist in a Member country
and the recipient country does not provide equivalent protection. 48 It is true
that the OECD guidelines support self-regulation, 49 but also encourage
countries to provide for “reasonable means” for individuals to exercise their
rights.50 Likewise, Member States should endeavor to develop principles to
govern the applicable law in the case of transborder flows of personal data.51
These principles could have a domestic or international approach.
Therefore, the OECD model could be considered a mixed model under
sources of inspirations from both transatlantic approaches. A question that
arises is the following: What is the advantage of having the basic principles
recognized at international level if later, nationally, sectoral regulation or
another type of self-regulation ignores key elements of the principles? Thus,
it seems a priori that the U.S. data protection system does not comply with

44

Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development: Guidelines on the Protection
of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, Sept. 23, 1980, OECD Doc. C (80) 58
reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 422 (1981) [hereinafter OECD, Guidelines].
45
Reidenberg, supra note 17, at 1353.
46
OECD, Guidelines, supra note 44, at Preface.
47
See OECD, Guidelines, supra note 44, §17.
48
See OECD, Guidelines, supra note 44, §17.
49
See OECD, Guidelines, supra note 44, §19(b).
50
See OECD Guidelines, supra note 44, §19(c).
51
See OECD Guidelines, supra note 44, §22.
11
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international principles.52 Consequently, a systemic legal conflict between EU
law and U.S. law would exist.
II.

GDPR OPTIONS
The GDPR provides a set of options to legalize cross-border data
transfer in Chapter V (articles 44-50). The most advantageous is obtaining an
adequacy decision from the European Commission (art. 45 GDPR). In the
absence of an adequacy decision, appropriate safeguards are needed for
transfers beyond the EU (art. 46 GDPR). The first section will analyze the
problems regarding an adequacy decision of the United States. The second
section will assess the option of appropriate safeguards, in particular the use
of standard contractual clauses.
A. Obtaining an Adequacy Decision
Obtaining an adequacy decision by a third country has the benefit that
no further requirements exist to transfer personal data from the EU. The
official webpage of the EU Commission assimilates the U.S. limited to the
Privacy Shield framework to other countries adequacy decisions (Andorra,
Argentina, Canada, Faroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Japan,
Jersey, New Zealand, Switzerland and Uruguay).53 Consequently,
international data transfers are assimilated to intra-EU transfers. An adequacy
decision usually covers all personal data towards a third country. Article 45
(1) of the GDPR allows finding adequacy for a “territory or one or more
specified sectors within that third country.” An example of a specific sector
where the EU has reached an agreement with the U.S. concerns the airline
Passenger Name Records transfers. 54
The requirements for a third country to comply with are the core
principles of data privacy: purpose limitation principle, data quality principle,
proportionality principle, transparency principle and security principle. 55 In
addition, onward transfers from the third country must also comply with the

52

Reidenberg, supra note 17, at 1337 (“In the absence of comprehensive data protection
legislation, the full range of internationally-recognized principles for fair information
practice may be hard to satisfy; narrow, sectoral laws, policies, ad hoc protections and
practices typically ignore key elements of the First Principles.”).
53
EU Commission, Adequacy Decisions, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/dataprotection/international-dimension-data-protection/adequacy-decisions_en (last visited June
15, 2020) (Adequacy talks are ongoing with South Korea).
54
See Agreement Between the United States of America and the European Union on the
Use and Transfer of Passenger Name Records to the United States Department of
Homeland Security, EU-U.S., Dec. 14, 2011, T.I.A.S. No. 12-701.
55
See Data Protection Working Party, Working Document (WP 12) of 24 July 1998 on
transfers of personal data to third a country. (DG XV D/5025/98).
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principles.56 Moreover, the data subject should have the right to access all data
concerning him and the right to rectification and opposition.
i.

International Commitments
In export data transactions the reference to international commitments
in Article 45 (2)(c) of the GDPR would include the Council of Europe
Convention 108 (CoE 108) plus the amending Protocol (2018) in order to
assess the adequacy of a third country’s data protection regime. 57 However,
the United States is not a member of the CoE 108 whilst eight non-Members
of Council of Europe signed the CoE 108.58
One difference in language exists to assess the data protection regime
of a third country as a recipient of personal data. The yardstick of the original
CoE 108 (1981) refers to an “equivalent protection” meanwhile the
Modernised Convention (2018) refers to an appropriate level of protection. 59
The criteria to evaluate an appropriate level of protection are (i) the law of a
third country State or international organisations, including the applicable
international treaties or agreements; or (ii) ad hoc or approved standardized
safeguards provided by legally-binding and enforceable instruments adopted
and implemented by the persons involved in the transfer and further
processing.60 Modernised Convention 108 aligns with GDPR as there are
grounds to allow personal data transfers even when not “appropriate level of
protection exists.” In particular, consent of the data subject, specific interests
of the data subject or legitimate public interests when these interests are
established by law and such transfer constitutes a necessary and proportionate
measure in a democratic society, including freedom of expression. The first
and last derogations, data subject’s consent and freedom of expression in a
democratic society are both novelties comparing the original with the
Modernised Convention. However, the explicit reference to freedom of
expression explicitly goes beyond the GDPR derogations. 61
56

See GDPR, arts. 44, 45 (2)(a).
Council of Europe, Modernised Convention for the protection of individuals with regard
to the processing of personal data, 2018, https://rm.coe.int/convention-108-convention-forthe-protection-of-individuals-with-regar/16808b36f1 [hereinafter Modernised Convention
108]; Protocol amending the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (ETS No. 108), 128th Session of the Committee of
Ministers (Elsinore, Denmark, 17-18 May 2018), Ad hoc Committee on Data Protection
(CAHDATA),
https://search.coe.int/cm/Pages/result_details.aspx?ObjectId=090000168089ff4e.
58
Eight non-members of Council of Europe signed the CoE 108 (Argentina, Cabo Verde,
Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Senegal, Tunisia, Uruguay), see https://www.coe.i
nt/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/108/signatures (last visited July 16,
2020).
59
See Modernised Convention 108, supra note 57, at 10.
60
See id. art. 14(3).
61
See GDPR, art. 49.
57
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If the United States would accede to the Modernised Convention, it
would be easier to conclude that the United States regime and the European
Union regime are equivalent. Some commentators consider that the CoE 108
offers a level of protection lower that the European regime. 62 However, the
amending Protocol enhances and clarifies data protection flows taken into
account the GDPR, which means that when the Modernised Convention
would be approved by every member of the Council of Europe, more
convergence between both regimes would exist. 63 Therefore, a third country
that overcomes the test of an appropriate level of protection via the
Modernised Convention would facilitate the GDPR test of an equivalent level
of protection. One of the advances of the Protocol is the broad application to
public and private sectors, without the option to exclude national security
activities.64 Likewise, the powers of supervisory authorities are clarified.
ii.

Adequacy Decisions are not Immune to Legal Challenges
Adequacy decisions issued by the EU Commission are not immune to
be challenged under a court proceeding. Data protection authorities are in
charge of monitoring and enforcing the GDPR. 65 Their tasks are detailed,
including to handle complaints lodged by data subjects or organisations that
represent data subjects66 and conduct investigations on the application of the
GDPR.67 Thus, ex parte or ex officio data protection authorities can challenge
the validity of an EU Commission adequate decision in legal proceedings (art.
57(5) of the GDPR). Data protection authorities may be obliged to suspend an
administrative procedure in order to request authorization from the judicial
body to declare if a Commission decision regarding international data
transfers is valid.68
62

See Julian Wagner, The Transfer of Personal Data to Third Countries Under the GDPR:
When Does a Recipient Country Provide an Adequate Level of Protection?, 8 INT’L DATA
PRIVACY L. 318, 327 (2018).
63
See generally Graham Greenleaf, A World Data Privacy Treaty? Globalisation and
Modernisation of Council of Europe Convention 108, in EMERGING CHALLENGES IN
PRIVACY LAW 101 (Normann Witzleb et al. eds., 2014).
64
See Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic
Processing of Personal Data art. 3, Sep. 28, 1981, European Treaty Series - No. 108
[hereinafter Modernised Convention 108]; see also Proposal for a Council Decision
authorizing Member States to sign, in the interest of the European Union, the Protocol
amending the Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (ETS No. 108) COM/2018/449 final - 2018/0237
(NLE), Brussels, 5.6.2018.
65
GDPR, art. 57 (1)(a).
66
GDPR, art. 57 (1)(f).
67
GDPR, art. 57 (1)(h).
68
See Disposición adicional quinta. Ley Orgánica 3/2018, de 5 de diciembre, de Protección
de Datos Personales y garantía de los derechos digitales, (Spanish Law of Data Protection,
(B.O.E. n. 294, December 6, 2018)).
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The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has exclusive
jurisdiction to declare invalid a Commission decision adopted to consider if a
third country ensures an adequate level of protection by reason of its domestic
law or regarding the international commitments it has entered. 69 National
courts can assess the validity of an EU act, but they cannot declare invalid
themselves, as they are not endowed with the necessary power. 70 The CJEU
uses a fortiori reasoning, considering that if national courts do not have
competence, neither the national supervisory authorities. A Commission
decision adopted pursuant to the article 25(6) of the Data Protection Directive
is an EU act. Therefore, the protection of privacy and fundamental rights
concerning transfer of personal data to third countries in the framework of a
Commission decision under article 45 of the GDPR can only be declared
invalid by the CJEU.
On the contrary, in the light of Article 8(3) of the Charter and article
28(3) of the Data Protection Directive where the national supervisory
authority considers that the person claim is well founded, the supervisory
authority must be able to engage in legal proceedings. 71 As a result,
supervisory authorities must have legal capacity to be part of legal
proceedings and bring the well-founded objections before national courts to
enable them to ask the CJEU for a preliminary ruling if required.
The consequences are crucial because when the claimant contends that
the law and practices in force in the third country do not ensure an adequate
level of protection and brings a claim before the national supervisory
authority, the supervisory authority must examine the claim, irrespectively of
the existence of a Commission decision regarding the compatibility with the
data transfers from the EU to a third country. 72 The right to private life, the
right to data protection and the right to an effective remedy are fundamental
rights under the EU Charter, enlightening the interpretation of personal data
rules. In the Schrems I case, the repealed Directive on data protection was read
together with articles 7, 8 and 47 of the EU Charter. This jurisprudence is alive
and applicable in regard to the section of the GDPR concerning data transfer
beyond the EU.73
iii.

The Safe Harbour Principles
U.S. privacy law was defined as a “patchwork of narrowly-focused
sectoral laws and voluntary self- regulation,” that could not be relied upon to
69

See Schrems v. Data Protection Comm'r, C-362/14, ¶ 61 (Oct. 6, 2015).
Id. ¶ 62 (citing judgments in Foto-Frost, 314/85, (EU:C:1987:452), ¶¶ 15-20, and IATA
and ELFAA, C-344/04, (EU:C:2006:10), ¶ 27).
71
See id. ¶ 65.
72
See Schrems I, supra note 43, ¶ 66.
73
See Schrems II, supra note 43, ¶¶ 156-58.
70
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provide adequate protection for data transferred from the EU in 1999. 74
However, the famous Safe Harbour Principles (SH) were an arrangement
negotiated by the European Commission and the Federal Trade Commission
to allow organisations to transfer personal data from the European Union to
the United States provided they were self-certified.75 Decision 2000/520
described seven SH Principles: notice, choice, onward transfer, security, data
integrity, access and enforcement. 76 SH scheme was voluntary and entered
into force in 2000.
Under the SH only companies subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) could self-certificate and a proceeding against
unfair and deceptive practices could be brought against the company who
failed to comply with their promises.77 For example, financial services would
not fall within the FTC powers. 78
The European Parliament in 2013 adopted several resolutions to urge
the EU Commission to take actions to renegotiate the agreement granting EU
citizens the right to information when their data is processed in the U.S.;
ensuring that EU citizens' access to the U.S. judicial system is equal to that
enjoyed by U.S. citizens, and that the right to redress is granted. 79
The three issues declared by the EU Commission in 2013 were the
following.80 First, the privacy policies of companies benefited from the SH
74

Opinion 1/99 of the Working Party on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data Concerning the Level of Data Protection in the United States
and the Ongoing Discussions Between the European Commission and the United States
Government (Jan. 26, 1999); https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article29/documentatio n/ opinionrecommendation/files/1999/wp15_en.pdf.
75
Without ex-ante verification from the FTC. See FAQ 6, Commission Decision of 26 July
2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
adequacy of the protection provided by the Safe Harbour privacy principles and related
frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce, 2000/520/EC, OJ, L
215/7 (Jul. 25, 2000).
76
Commission Decision 2000/520, annex I, 2000 O.J. (EC).
77
Shara Monteleone & Laura Puccio, From Safe Harbour to Privacy Shield: Advances and
Shortcomings of the New EU-US Data Transfer Rules, at 6 (Jan. 2017). Other enforcement
is undertaken by the US Department of Transportation for members who are subject to its
jurisdiction. See Damon Greer, Safe Harbour—a framework that works, 1 INTERNATIONAL
DATA PRIVACY LAW, 143, 146 (2011).
78
See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2000 on the level of protection
provided by the “Safe Harbor Principles,” adopted on May 16, 2000, CA07/434/00/EN WP
32.
79
Resolution of 4 July 2013 on the US National Security Agency Surveillance Programme,
Surveillance Bodies in Various Member States and Their Impact on EU Citizens’ Privacy,
2016 O.J.(C 075) 14.
80
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on
Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows, 2013 O.J. (C 846); Communication from the
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were opaque, which affected the enforceability by the FTC. Second, there was
not a follow-up of the validity of the SH certification by the U.S. Department
of Commerce. Third, the mechanism lacked means of redress for European
citizens once the data were transferred to the U.S. Interestingly, the first
implementation report of the functioning of SH by the European Commission
on 20 October 2014, also identified that the concerned privacy policies were
not publicly accessible, there was a lack of FTC enforcement and questioned
third party dispute resolution mechanisms. The justification for not renewing
the certification of 20% of companies was that “employees responsible for
managing Safe Harbour compliance have left the organization without a
transfer of duties to new personnel.”81 What type of commitment with privacy
have organizations that do not continue with the self-certification method
based on self-assessment?82 Considering that if cost of non-complying with
privacy law was larger than complying with data protection law, 83 it seems
rare that companies do not train their employees to comply with privacy law.
Some first skepticism regarding the attitude of U.S. companies about how
global businesses operate with privacy laws arose. 84
Safe Harbour defenders considered that its success was measured in
terms of raising the level of privacy compliance in the U.S. 85 This sort of
statements brings to light hat the level of privacy protection in the United
States was lower than in Europe, precisely because the United States never
asked for approval of an adequate decision by the Commission, since they
sensed that the response by the European Commission would be negative. 86
That is why the SH was reached as a compromise. However, the CJEU ruled
that the SH framework did not satisfy the “essentially equivalent” data
protection under EU law.87 Schrems I invalidated the Commission decision
underlying SH. The rights of European citizens had been unprotected since

Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Functioning of the SH
From the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EU, 2013 O.J. (C
847).
81
Greer, supra note 77, at 147.
82
See FAQ 7, Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the
Safe Harbour privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the US
Department of Commerce, 2000/520/EC, OJ, L 215/7 (Jul. 25, 2000).
83
See Ponenom Institute, Cost of Compliance: Benchmark Study of Multinational
Organizations 2 (Jan. 2011),
https://www.ponemon.org/local/upload/file/True_Cost_of_Compliance_Report_copy.pdf
($9.4 million versus $3.5 million).
84
See Mary E. McIntire, How a Law Seminar Inspired a Student to Bring a Case to
Europe’s Top Court, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (Oct. 7, 2015),
https://www.chronicle.com/article/How-a-Law-Seminar-Inspired-a/233682.
85
Greer, supra note 77, at 145.
86
See Greer, supra note 77, at 144.
87
Schrems I, supra note 43, ¶ 96.
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the conception of the political commitment between the United States
Government and the European Commission.88
From the legal-political point of view, on both sides of the Atlantic it
was known that the SH failed to meet European standards on data privacy,
despite designed to be complied to it.89 The SH was active from its inception
until it was struck down by the CJEU. But was this invalidation surprising?
The legal battle simply granted European citizens the rights that they already
have in their laws before 2015. American scholars warned the U.S. authorities,
in particular the U.S. Department of Commerce, that the SH Principles did not
meet European standards. Professor Schwartz expressly stated “the safe
harbor principles largely track the worst aspects of the industry codes of
conduct.”90 The European Parliament also warned the EU Commission before
and after the SH Principles were enforced91. Hence, during 15 years European
citizens’ rights have been infringed. Only when the press and media focus on
a particular event, this event gets on the public eye and the political discourse
incorporates the claims of citizens, users and consumers.
iv.

The EU Charter Significance
It is noteworthy that the rules of the Directive 45/95 continue in the
GDPR, although its enforcement had been doubtful in the past.92 Different
reasons could justify such result: DPAs did not have sufficient means; 93
Member States in the transposition of the Directive did not agree on the
limitation of data transfers because it was considered a limitation on the
prospects for trade, as different regulation of exemptions shows; 94 or because
simply verifying compliance with EU law beyond borders is very difficult,
especially if there is no collaboration with foreign government entities. Weak
implementation of Articles 25 and 26 of the Data Protection Directive was
considered a “litmus test” for the Directive’s international credibility and
88

Joe McNamee, Fifteen Years Late, Safe Harbor Hits the Rocks, EUROPEAN DIGITAL
RIGHTS (Oct. 6, 2015), https://edri.org/safeharbor-the-end/ (“In reality, however, the case
is much deeper than ‘just’ mass surveillance. The European Commission has never had the
political courage to recognize that Safe Harbor was never safe.”).
89
See Letter from Fred H. Cate, Robert E. Litan, Joel R. Reidenberg, Paul M. Schwartz &
Peter P. Swire to David L. Aaron, Undersecretary for International Trade, U.S. Dep't of
Com. (Nov. 17, 1998), https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~goguen/courses/268D/agre.safe.html.
90
Schwartz, supra note 31, at 1699.
91
See European Parliament resolution of 12 March 2014 on the US NSA surveillance
programme, surveillance bodies in various Member States and their impact on EU citizens’
fundamental rights and on transatlantic cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs
(2013/2188(INI)), OJ 2017, C 378/104, (Nov. 2017).
92
EUROPEAN COMM’N, FIRST REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DATA
PROTECTION DIRECTIVE (95/46/EC) 18-19 (May 15, 2003).
93
Lee A. Bygrave, Privacy Protection in a Global Context: A Comparative Overview, 47
SCANDINAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 319, 346 (2004).
94
See EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 92, at 11.
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success.95 However, strong implementation would also be accused of creating
a bureaucratic procedure that could hamper trade, so avoidance was a logical
scape.
This debate is linked to the scope of extraterritorial application of EU
data protection rules, which has been founded on the protection of
fundamental rights of EU residents beyond their situs of residence. 96 It could
be argued that the essence of the fundamental right to data protection is
enshrined in Article 8 of the EU Charter where a reference to cross-border
data transfers is missing. Having jurisdiction and imposing limits when
personal data have crossed borders and it is already located in a third country
could be considered against the comity principle.
However, the CJEU held that satisfying an objective of general
interest, namely against serious crime and public security was not exempt of
limits and assessment of the secondary law in light of the fundamental rights
needed to comply with the principle of proportionality.97 Two mentions in the
Digital Rights Ireland judgement could be key for data transfer abroad.
Article 8 of the Charter was mentioned twice and can be considered the
essential notion of data protection. First, Data Retention Directive did not
provide for sufficient safeguards as the Directive did not ensure effective
protection of the data “retained” against the risk of abuse and against any
unlawful access and use of that data.98 Second, a lack of reference to a prior
review by a court or by an independent administrative body was missing in
the Data Retention Directive, considering the access of competent national
courts.99 Article 8 (3) of the Charter was referred as an essential component
of the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal
data.100
Although the Data Retention Directive objective was to harmonize
Member State law on retention of certain data on electronic communication,
so within the EU borders, the same standards have been followed by the CJEU
to assess the legality of data transfers abroad with EU fundamental rights. 101
The Privacy Shield did not pass muster at the proportionality test by virtue of
analyzing the real powers of the Commission.102 The discretion of the EU
legislature must be also reduced, knowing in advance that personal data
transferred to the U.S. is accessed by U.S. enforcement authorities.
95

Bygrave, supra note 93, at 348.
See supra Section I (C).
97
See CJEU, Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland (8 April 2014),
(EU:C:2014:238), ¶ 54-60 [hereinafter CJEU, Digital Rights Ireland].
98
CJEU, Digital Rights Ireland, ¶ 66.
99
CJEU, Digital Rights Ireland, ¶ 68.
100
CJEU, Digital Rights Ireland, ¶ 68, referring to Case C-614/10 Commission v Austria
(EU:C:2012:631), ¶ 37.
101
See Schrems I, supra note 43, ¶ 58.
102
Schrems II, supra note 43, ¶ 201.
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In Digital Rights Ireland, discretion of the EU legislature was curtailed
because there was a wide interference with fundamental rights. Similarly, in
Schrems I the CJEU held that the Commission’s discretion is reduced when
assessing the adequacy level ensured by a third country.103 The key difference
is that the high level of protection of personal data continues when data are
transferred to a third country, following AG Yves Bot. 104 However, AG Bot
called for a global assessment of law and practice in the third country, 105 but
the CJEU only refers to law, following the literal wording of the article 25 (6)
of the Data Protection Directive, domestic law and international
commitments.106 Indeed, article 25 (2) of the Data Protection Directive was
more specific: “the nature of the data, the purpose and duration of the
proposed processing operation or operations, the country of origin and country
of final destination, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the
third country in question and the professional rules and security measures
which are complied with in that country.” Moreover, this list is nonexhaustive.107
The determining factor in Bot’s opinion is that “adequate” must be
interpreted within the objective of the Data Protection Directive. Therefore, it
discards the linguistic meaning of “sufficient protection” and it is closer to the
meaning of “appropriate,” insisting on data transfer to third countries should
not be given a lower level of protection than processing within the EU. 108
According to AG Bot, “it must not be forgotten that the objective of Article
25 of Directive 95/46 is to prevent personal data from being transferred to a
third country that does not ensure an adequate level of protection, in breach
of the fundamental right to protection of personal data guaranteed by Article
8 of the Charter.”109
The ratio of the adequacy requirements to such an extent are
equivalent, since the adequate level of protection required by the GDPR
corresponds to the level of data protection required by the EU Charter.
However, the EU Charter was neither binding when the Directive entered into
force nor when the SH Principles were approved by the EU Commission. With
the GDPR in force, clearly the EU Charter has the same weight that the
Foundational Treaties,110 so a fortiori, the level of adequate protection from
the Charter must have the same expression in the GDPR. Privacy Shield, like
103

Schrems I, supra note 43, ¶ 78.
See Opinion of AG Bot, delivered on 23 September 2015, Case C-362/14;
(EU:C:2015:627), ¶140 [hereinafter Schrems I Advocate General Opinion]. See also
Schrems I, supra note 43, ¶72.
105
Schrems I Advocate General Opinion, supra note 104, ¶ 141.
106
See Schrems I, supra note 43, ¶ 73.
107
See Schrems I, supra note 43, ¶ 70.
108
Schrems I Advocate General Opinion, supra note 104, ¶ 144.
109
Schrems I, supra note 43, ¶ 148.
110
See 2012 O.J. (C. 326) 232.
104
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Safe Harbour, intrinsically concerns processing of personal data under the
meaning of GDPR (art. 4.2) because both are mechanisms to transfer
commercial data to the United States. EU data protection law is applied
indirectly to the United States, without any practical difference between direct
application and indirect application of EU data protection law. 111
Thus, the territorial scope of the Charter should be the same as the
GDPR, as this is a European Regulation. 112
v.

The Surveillance Matter
The hegemony of the U.S. as a surveillance country is rooted in some
economical and technical reasons. The Internet backbone location routes
through the U.S., even foreign to foreign communication, and popular
software and hardware companies are based in the U.S. 113
According to the European Commission, “the large scale access by
intelligence agencies to data transferred to the US in the context of
commercial transactions was not foreseeable at the time of adopting the Safe
Harbour.”114 In the same communication the European Commission
acknowledged that U.S. law allows large-scale collection and processing of
personal data that is stored or otherwise processed by companies based in the
United States.115 Data transferred under SH to companies certified was easily
accessible by U.S. authorities and intelligence under espionage programs like
PRISM and these interferences went beyond what is strictly necessary and
proportionate to the protection of national security as foreseen under the
exception provided in the Safe Harbour Decision.
The CJEU did not analyzed the SH principles, but the fact that they
were only binding the self-certified private entities, and not public authorities
was noted as a gap of the mechanism. 116 The adequate level of protection is
measured only in relation to what was considered in the Decision 2000/520. 117
Thus, the CJEU did not consider any development in U.S. law. But, should
the CJEU judge U.S. law, a conflict of jurisdiction starts, so judge Lenaerts is
111

See Christopher Kuner, Reality and Illusion in EU Data Transfer Regulation Post
Schrems, GERMAN L. J. 881, 893 (2017).
112
See Violeta Moreno-Lax & Cathryn Costello, The Extraterritorial Application of the EU
Charter of Fundamental Rights: From Territoriality to Facticity, the Effectiveness Model,
in THE EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 1657 (Steve Peers et al.
eds., 2014); Case C-617/10, Åklagaren v Åkerberg Fransson, 2013 C.J.E.U. ¶ 21.
113
BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH 64 (2015).
114
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on
the Functioning of the Safe Harbor from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies
Established in the EU, at 16, COM (2013) 847 final (Nov. 27, 2013).
115
Id. at 17.
116
Schrems I, supra note 43, ¶ 82.
117
Schrems I, supra note 43, ¶ 83.
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right when states: “we are not judging the U.S. system here, we are judging
the requirements of EU law in terms of conditions to transfer data to third
countries, whatever they be.”118 However, the judgment recognizes that the
Decision 2000/520 establishes a primacy of U.S. law over EU law, in
particular national security, public interest, or law enforcement requirements,
so self- certified United States organisations are “bound to disregard those
principles without limitation where they conflict with those requirements and
therefore prove incompatible with them.”119
Decision 2000/520 did not establish any limits of interference by
public authorities with fundamental rights,120 when the EU Commission knew
that U.S. authorities could access to personal data transferred and processing
them in an incompatible manner. 121 The Commission did not ensure that U.S.
governmental access was strictly necessary and proportional and noticed that
data subjects did not have administrative or judicial redress. 122 However, the
CJEU did not explicitly mention data protection as a fundamental right when
dealing with the interference on public interest requirements, but only referred
to establish the existence of an interference with article 7 of the Charter, the
fundamental right to respect for private life.123 Digital Rights Ireland case was
referred, but in that case the CJEU considered an interference of both article
7 and article 8 of the EU Charter.124
In U.S. law there was a distinction between crime and espionage. 125
On the one hand, investigating crimes need to follow the procedures under
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).126 ECPA is a federal law
that requires court orders to start surveillance in order to uncover a crime. On
the other hand, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) 127 regulates
espionage and how U.S. agencies gather foreign intelligence information
within the U.S.128 Despite court orders are needed and they are granted by a
special federal court, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)
118

Valentina Pop, ECJ President on EU Integration, Public Opinion, Safe Harbor,
Antitrust, WALL ST. J.: BRUSSELS BLOG (Oct. 14, 2015),
https://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2015/10/14/ecj-president-on-eu-integration-public-opinionsafe-harbor-antitrust/.
119
Schrems I, supra note 43, ¶ 86.
120
Schrems I, supra note 43, ¶ 88.
121
Schrems I, supra note 43, ¶ 90.
122
Schrems I, supra note 43, ¶ 90.
123
Schrems I, supra note 43, ¶ 87.
124
Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12, Digit. Rts. Ireland v. Minister for Commc’ns,
Marine and Nat. Res., EU:C:2014:238, ¶ 37 (Apr. 8, 2014).
125
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PRIVACY AND
SECURITY 71 (2011).
126
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522,
2701-2711, 3121-3127 (2002).
127
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11 (2015).
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Solove, supra note 124, at 73.
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meetings of the court are secret and orders are issued without the need of
suspicion of wrongdoing.129 One significant difference in a trial is that
defendants can access the documents justifying the surveillance under ECPA,
but FISA only allow review in camera.130 The order under ECPA can last
longer periods that under FISA and up to 120 days when a non-U.S. person is
the target.131 During the Bush Administration FISA was expanding and the
subtle line between crime and espionage investigation was eliminated with
the introduction of one word. Instead of “the purpose” of the investigation was
to gather foreign intelligence, the PATRIOT Act introduced “a significant
purpose” of the investigation.132 Moreover, the FISA Amendments Act of
2008 permit the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence to
acquire foreign intelligence information by jointly authorizing surveillance of
individuals who are not "United States persons" and are reasonably believed
to be located outside the U.S. Finally, Section 702 FISA authorizes foreign
surveillance programs by the NSA.
B. Standard Contractual Clauses
i.

A Contractual Alternative
Contract tools are a widely used mechanism to transfer personal data
from the EU to the US. International data transfers can use “appropriate
safeguards” as a legal basis pursuant to Article 46 of the GDPR. Standard data
protection clauses adopted by the Commission are referred to in art. 46 (2) (c)
GDPR. The CJEU has clarified that Standard Contractual Clauses (SCCs)
adopted by the Commission Decision 2010/87 are valid. 133Two relevant
Commission Decisions exist with regard to SCCs. One establishes SCCs for
data transfers from data controllers in the EU to data controllers established
outside the EU or European Economic Area (EEA) (Commission Decision
2001/497/EC of 15 June 2001, modified by 2004/915/EC of 27 December
2004).134 Another set of contractual clauses, adopted by the Commission
129
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131
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1881(a)(g). Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 423 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
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Decision 2010/87, are for data transfers from controllers in the EU to
processors established outside the EU or EEA.135 Commission Implementing
Decision (EU) 2016/2297 of 16 December 2016 amends Decisions
2001/497/EC and 2010/87/EU to implements Schrems I judgment.136 Data
protection authorities’ (DPAs) powers are provided on the GDPR 137 and
cannot be restricted by any Commission Decision. 138
On the other hand, SCCs can also be adopted by a DPA and approved
by the Commission under art. 46(2)(d) of the GDPR.
From a terminological perspective, there is a change with regard to art.
25 (2) Data Protection Directive, which referred to “adequate safeguards.”
This word change could suggest that safeguards have to be high and not
merely sufficient, as in English the meaning can be controversial. 139 However,
these protections apply to a particular data transfer when there is no adequacy
in a third country to which data are to be transferred. 140 This protection is a
“middle protection,” that should be differentiated from the standard of the
highest protection, only under an adequacy decision issued by the European
Commission. In principle, these standards are different and an invalidation of
one legal basis does not affect another legal basis. 141
Decision 2010/87 has the effect of preventing DPAs to refuse data
transfers made under contracts that incorporate the standard contractual
clauses approved by the Commission. Organisations can use standard
contractual clauses approved by the Commission for transfers within and
beyond the EU. In contrast, standard contractual clauses adopted by a data
protection authority can only be used for international transfer from the
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jurisdiction of that authority (art. 28 (8) GDPR).142 Pursuant to art. 46 (2)(c)
GDPR if an organization used SCCs approved by the EU Commission, no
requirement to obtain a DPAs’ authorization is needed. This is a significant
change in comparison to the repealed Data Protection Directive.143 However,
DPAs in Member States retain powers to prohibit or suspend data flows in
exceptional circumstances (art. 37 (1) (j) GDPR). 144
SCCs are a template agreement drafted by the EU Commission in
order to speed negotiations and contracting between data exporters and
importers outside the EEA. The main purpose of SCCs would be to
compensate for any deficiencies in the protection afforded by the third country
of destination. In AG Saugmandsgaard øe opinion, the SCCs could not depend
on the level of protection guaranteed in the third country of destination.145
This opinion in part has been reversed by the Schrems II judgment,146 bringing
SCCs in a comma.147
The EU Commission does not have an obligation to evaluate the level of data
protection in countries to which data are transferred under SCC, because the
object of a SCC Decision is not a third country, a territory or a specific
sector.148 The Irish Data Protection Court in May of 2016 considered that
SCCs could not address the deficiency in U.S. law, which failed to provide
legal remedies to EU citizens.
ii.

Obligations on Private Parties
SCCs pursuant to the requirement of Article 46(1) and Article 46(2)(c)
of the GDPR, interpreted in the light of Articles 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter,
incorporates effective mechanisms that make it possible, in practice, to ensure
compliance with the level of protection required by EU law. Transfers of
personal data under the clauses of such a decision are suspended or prohibited
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in the event of the breach of such clauses or it being impossible to honour
them.149
According to Decision 2010/87, the applicable law to evaluate the
protection of fundamental rights is the law of the Member State in which the
data exporter is established.150 Therefore, GDPR forms part of that
legislation.151 The CJEU does not mention any Member State law that could
be used as comparator between surveillance law in an EU Member State and
the U.S. EU data controllers or processors and the recipient of personal data
are obliged in particular by Clause 4(a) and Clause 5(a)-(b) of Decision
2010/87 to ensure that the law of the third country of destination does not go
beyond what is necessary in a democratic society to safeguard, inter alia,
national security, defense and public security and are not in contradiction with
those standard data protection clauses.152 The verifications must be done prior
to the transfer from the EU to the third country. Pursuant to Clause 5(b) of
Decision 2010/87, the recipient is under an obligation to inform the controller
of any inability to comply with those clauses, giving the power to suspend the
transfer of data and/or to terminate the contract to the EU controller. 153
Power becomes an obligation. The controller is under a special
obligation to inform the data subject before the data transfer or as soon as
possible after. This obligation seems to be triggered only when special
categories of data are transferred under Clause 4 (f) of Decision 2010/87. The
data subject enforced its rights against the data exporter as third-party
beneficiary (Clause 3 Decision 2010/87). The importer of the data does not
have the obligation of informing the data subject concerned, but informing the
data exporter under Clause 5(d) Decision 2010/87. The data subject can bring
legal action against the controller (the data exporter) and have the right to
compensatory damages as a result of any breach of the obligations referred to
in Clause 3 (Third-party beneficiary clause) or in Clause 11 (sub-processing)
of Decision 2010/87.
Moreover, the data exporter liability could be claimed against the data
importer, arising out of a breach by the data importer or by his sub-processor
of any of their obligations when the data exporter has factually disappeared or
ceased to exist in law or has become insolvent. 154
149
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In case of a change in the relevant legislation which is likely to have a
substantial adverse effect on the warranties and obligations provided by the
standard data protection clauses, the controller is obliged to suspend the data
transfer or notifying to continue the transfer. The mechanism seems to be
active by the call of the data importer or a sub-processor in the third country
concerned. It is not clear how the competent supervisory authority would
control whether the proposed transfer should be suspended or prohibited in
order to ensure an adequate level of protection. According to Clause 4(g), the
controller (data exporter) should receive the notification by the data importer
and communicate to the supervisory authority afterwards.
Therefore, a private party is obliged to assess the law of the concerned
third country to ascertain whether the proposed transfer should be suspended
or prohibited in case it does not ensure an adequate level of protection.
Besides, according to the CJEU, the competent supervisory authority has not
only a “right” to conduct an audit of the recipient of personal data, 155 but it is
also required “to execute its responsibility for ensuring that the GDPR is fully
enforced with all due diligence.” 156
The GDPR is clear in article 58 (f) and (j) that the supervisory
authority shall have corrective powers, such as impose a ban on processing or
order the suspension of data flows to a recipient in a third country. The result
is that the same proactive requirement is placed on supervisory authorities to
analyze on a case-by-case basis when equivalent protection cannot be ensured.
The new adding in Schrems II is that data controllers must stop data transfers
without waiting from a supervisory authority intervention, having an
independent duty. The door is open to disagreements between different EU
nations and even controllers about whether a particular country’s law is
adequate.
As Schrems used similar arguments that causes the annulment of the
Safe Harbour Principles to challenge SCCs, one could think that the
mechanism used to transfer data to a third country does not affect the result if
the third country’s law is not essentially equivalent to EU law. The essence of
the fundamental rights is not measured in the specific mechanism but
according to the recipient country of data transfers (the importing country).
Brussels effect157 would translate in a de facto regulation of the recipient
country data protection law, albeit indirectly by data transfer legislation of the
exporting country.
It remains to be seen how an EU controller or processor can
compensate for the lack of data protection in a third country by way of
appropriate safeguards when the SCCs do not bind public authorities. A
155
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contractual mechanism based on SCCs should apply uniformly in all third
countries to controllers and processors established in the European Union and,
consequently, independently of the level of protection guaranteed in each third
country.158 The CJEU suggests controllers or processors using
“supplementary measures” to protect data under the SCCs159, but does not
specify what measures these could be when the third country law is contrary
to the SCC. From the CJEU reasoning, it is inferred that private parties (EU
controllers and processors) are under an obligation to provide contractual
guarantee of an adequate level of protection against access by the public
authorities of that third country in order to continue transferring personal data.
One solution could be data encryption, but the issues concerning government
surveillance laws cannot be solved by private parties.
III.

PRIVACY SHIELD: SOLUTION TO A TRADE CONFLICT
Privacy Shield Decision is a mechanism for transferring commercial
data from the EU to the U.S.160 The Privacy Shield was called a “cosmetic”
make-over of the Safe Harbour agreement.161 The main concern is that U.S.
authorities are accessing this data without adequate safeguards, in particular
the NSA surveillance programs have been challenged. Personal data could be
accessed for national security purposes in a nebulous in between detection of
crime and espionage.
As of 20 July 2020, 5394 organizations were certified under the
Privacy Shield162.The Privacy Shield could be suspended, amended or
repealed in three scenarios: when U.S. public authorities fail to comply with
the commitments, when complaints by EU data subjects are not systematically
effectively address or when the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson does not
provide timely and appropriate responses to EU data subjects
systematically.163
A. Surveillance Interference: A Problem Not Solved
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The new techniques appearing in the ’60 obligated a rebalance of
privacy and surveillance due to the low cost of resources and the ease with
which new technologies have been used for penetration of privacy. Today the
surveillance problem is not different, but the surveillance state is more
exhaustive than ever before because it is perpetrated by private means. It can
be argued that legislation was already considered anachronistic in 1992. 164
Surveillance done by the intelligence community is facilitated by the existing
corporate surveillance.165 Scholars have coined the term “surveillance
capitalism.”166 Consumers accept corporate surveillance because they want to
use their products, which are convenient. We should ask ourselves if there is
any option not to trade our privacy for convenience. No privacy seems the
price citizens have to pay to enjoy apps and electronic services. Without data
protection laws, no private rights are to be asserted, so when international
cooperation reaches an agreement that does not comply with basic
international data privacy principles, which is really the position of an
individual citizen?
Predominantly consumers don’t really have a choice to opt-out of
corporate surveillance.167 The business apparatus to exploit customers is used
not only for law enforcement but to prevent any risks. Without business
collaboration with national agencies, government surveillance would be not
so easy. And more important, business privacy policies need to protect
consumers, but without legal frameworks, enforcement is impossible.
Sometimes, even with an apt legal framework, public enforcement does not
repair the real damage.168 Although privacy and security are not the same
concept, they complement each other, because security defines which privacy
choices should be implemented.169 According to Westin, the weighing process
is defined in five steps to balance competing interests: the seriousness of the
need to conduct surveillance, if alternative methods to meet the end exist, the
reliability of the instrument, the need to consent and the capacity for limitation
and control the surveillance mechanism. 170 If pointing to a social problem and
164
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solving it through surveillance is the only alternative, we can affirm that it
doesn’t exist a balance between privacy and surveillance.
From another angle but with the same background, Trump
administration planned to ban Chinese social media in the U.S., claiming that
personal data are prone to data requests from the Chinese government.171
Although it is not clear what will finally happen, the location of a parent social
media in China threatens national security, foreign policy and economy of the
United States according to the executive orders.
The CJEU shows consistency with its previous judgement invalidating
the SH principles.172 The EU Commission could have been more cautious
when agreeing in the language used in the PS. The Privacy Shield recognizes
primacy of U.S. law over PS Principles ‘to the extent necessary to meet
national security, public interest, or law enforcement requirements’
(paragraph I.5. of Annex II, under the heading ‘EU-U.S. Privacy Shield
Framework Principles). The CJEU remembers that in case of conflict between
the Privacy Shield Principles and requirements on U.S. law, organizations are
not only bound by the PS Principles, but also bound to disregard the PS
principles without limitation. This is a relevant interpretation of the PS
decision that it was not obvious in the literal language used. Indeed, the PS
decision states “adherence to these principles may be limited,” not “should be
limited.” According to this interpretation, organizations had no choice in case
of conflict between PS Principles and national security, public interest, or law
enforcement requirements.
The CJEU is brave in signaling three U.S. legal acts where an
interference with the fundamental rights of the persons whose personal data
is or could be transferred from the European Union to the United States. 173
The likelihood of transferring data is enough to trigger an interference with
fundamental rights. It was already held that “it does not matter whether the
information in question relating to private life is sensitive or whether the
persons concerned have suffered any adverse consequences on account of that
interference.”174 This is a significant difference with U.S. law standing.175
PRISM and Upstream surveillance programmes under Section 702 of
the FISA and E.O. 12333 are the focus of the ruling. The CJEU does not
prohibit surveillance programs, the analysis is limited to verify if appropriate
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safeguards exist in U.S. law to limit U.S. access authorities to personal data
transferred for commercial purposes.
NSA can access to all communication through internet services
providers with a “selector” under the PRISM program.176 Moreover, under the
Upstream programme telecommunications companies are also required to
allow the NSA to copy and filter internet traffic flows of communications sent
or received by a non-US national associated with a selector or when
communications are about that person.177 A case is pending before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that will need to rule on the
constitutionality with the Fourth Amendment of the Upstream surveillance. 178
B. Absence of Compatibility Between U.S. and EU Law
i.

Previous Uncertainty Concerning Compatibility
Three French non-profit organizations claimed that the Privacy Shield
failed to take into consideration the generalized nature of the collections
allowed and the lack of effective remedy provided for under the U.S.
regulatory regime.179 Therefore, according to them, the U.S. protection was
not substantially equivalent to that guaranteed within the European Union.
They claim an infringement of the essence of the fundamental right to respect
for private life guaranteed by Article 7 of the Charter. The three arguments
were that operations allowed under the U.S. regulatory regime are not limited
to what is strictly necessary, that there is a lack of an effective remedy and
that there is also a lack of a provision of independent monitoring under the
U.S. law.
In contrast to that argument, Professor Swire considers that U.S.
surveillance law is compatible with EU fundamental rights. His claims are
based on a strict rule of law, separations of powers and judicial oversight by
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) of national security
surveillance180. The judges of the FISC are independent federal judges with a
lifetime appointment.181 He considers that the Advocate General in the
Schrems I case was not correct when he described that the NSA accessed the
176
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data through Facebook in a generalized and comprehensive manner, what was
“mass, indiscriminate.”182 Section 702 of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act was revised in 2008 to cover surveillance based on targeting purposes of
non-US citizens located outside the U.S.183 To do that it is needed a
certification of the FISC and identifiers (email address or phone number),
which are used to limit collections and queries. 184 NSA can access to the full
contents of communications, but raw data is destroyed after a period of two
to five years.185 This information is disseminated with other intelligence
agencies. Foreign to foreign communications that are stored on US data
servers can only be accessed by a federal court order (FISC) and following
Section 702 FISA. However, the fact that only a small fraction of global
internet users are effective targets under the Section 702 FISA (in 2014 there
were 92,707) seems the arguable hard reason. 186 According to a FISC opinion,
“over 90% of the Internet communications obtained by the NSA in 2011 under
Section 702 actually resulted from PRISM, with less than 10% coming from
Upstream.”187 Professor Swire thinks that if PRISM is considered a target
program, Upstream should also be considered target because the collection is
carried out with the same selector process. 188 But that is not what we can read
in the New York Times: “The collection is part of a broader program under a
2008 law that allows warrantless surveillance on domestic networks as long
as it is targeted at noncitizens abroad.”189
NSA collection activities conducted illegally after 9/11 were
authorized retroactively under Section 702 of FISA.190 There were minimal
protections for U.S. citizens.191 Americans and non-Americans are on the
same boat, because data about innocent people are found in authorized
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intelligence targets.192 However, people cannot prove they are under
surveillance.193
The Five Eyes is a partnership of intelligence agencies of Englishlanguage-speaking countries: U.S., UK, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
The Nine Eyes adds France, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway: and the
Fourteen Eyes, includes, Germany, Spain, Italy, Belgium and Sweden. 194 The
NSA captures the communications of citizens of one country when they transit
another country, therefore, it can be considered in accordance with the
intelligence agencies agreement. 195 But the U.S. also shares data with
Israel,196 Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.
Some voices consider that surveillance programs as PRISM make the
U.S. and its allies safer. However, that is questionable in light of an Open
memorandum submitted to President Obama by Former NSA Senior
Executives in 2014. Former NSA officials acknowledged that the massive
collection of data does not enhance the ability to prevent terrorism, as
telephone records prevent zero terrorist plots.197 They explained that a devised
process called THINTHREAD was developed by a group of NSA
mathematicians and computer technology before 9/11 for collection and rapid
analysis of billions of electronic records relating to targets of intelligence
interest.198 THINTHREAD ensures automatic encryption of information
about U.S. persons, complying with the standard of FISA and the Fourth
Amendment.199 Therefore, “data on U.S. citizens could be decrypted only if a
judge approved it after a finding that there was probable cause to believe that
the target was connected with terrorism or other crimes.” 200 This open
memorandum demonstrates that abuses have occurred at least in terms of the
procedures used by the NSA. However, the focus is on U.S. persons, whose
192
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privacy has been abused. Nothing is said about foreign targets, but it would
not be surprising a positive answer, as access was provided. According to
these ex senior NSA executives, “[t]hat NSA’s bulk collection is more
hindrance than help in preventing terrorist attacks should be clear by now
despite the false claims and dissembling.”201

ii.

The Schrems II Ruling: The Proportionality Principle
The absence of compatibility between U.S. and EU law does not focus
on commercial privacy rights in the landmark Schrems II ruling on 16 July
2020. The CJEU’s analysis focuses on the lack of proportionality and
limitations in surveillance measures targeting non-American citizens.
Limitation of fundamental rights are plausible, but pursuant to art. 52 (1) of
the EU Charter only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of
general interest recognized by the Union or the need to protect the rights and
freedoms of others.
The principle of proportionality is applied to PRISM and Upstream
programs regulated under Section 702 FISA. The CJEU states that the FISC
does not review if ‘individuals are properly targeted to acquire foreign
intelligence information’ because the focus is checking whether those
surveillance programmes relate to the objective of acquiring foreign
intelligence information.202 On the other hand, Presidential Policy Directive
28 (PPD-28) allows for bulk collection and limits on dissemination and
retention, but does not grant data subjects actionable rights before the courts
against the U.S. authorities.203 Moreover, E.O. 12333 allows access to data
overseas and in transit to the United States without that access being subject
to any judicial review. Thus, in any event, E.O. 12333 does not delimit in a
sufficiently clear and precise manner the scope of such bulk collection of
personal data.204 The CJEU wants to ensure that the persons whose data are
transferred have sufficient guarantees to protect effectively their personal data
against risk of abuse. The concerned legal basis must “indicate in what
circumstances and under which conditions a measure providing for the
processing of such data may be adopted, thereby ensuring that the interference
is limited to what is strictly necessary.”205 Furthermore, automated processing
exacerbates the need for such safeguards. 206 The lack of proportionality refers
to collection and use of personal data and the need of minimum safeguards of
control over use and retention of personal data gathered by the government.
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Finally, the CJEU held in Schrems II that the U.S. did not provide an
equivalent protection to the EU. The limitations on U.S. surveillance
programs in Section 702 of the FISA and E.O. 12333, together with read PPD28, “correlates to the minimum safeguards resulting, under EU law, from the
principle of proportionality, with the consequence that the surveillance
programmes based on those provisions cannot be regarded as limited to what
is strictly necessary.”207 Consequently, the PS Decision does not satisfy that
the requirements on U.S. domestic law on access and use by public authorities
of such data transferred from the EU to the U.S. are essentially equivalent to
those required under article 52 (1) of the EU Charter.208
Schrems II judgment shows that different parts of a legal system are
not watertight compartments. Trade may be affected as a consequence of lack
of guarantees and limitations of the laws on surveillance, whose object is
national security and public interest. The AG's opinion at Schrems I was
criticized for its views on mass surveillance. 209 The CJEU did not mention
that mass and undifferentiated accessing of personal data is clearly contrary
to the principle of proportionality and the fundamental values, but that it was
raised by the Irish High Court in relation to the compatibility with the Irish
Constitution.210
The pivotal concern in Schrems II is not a transatlantic understanding
of privacy principles in the private sector, which has always been a significant
difference between the European and American approaches. The difference
lies in the effects of data access by the government, an issue in which
Americans have always been pioneers and have tended to fear their
government more than companies. The fact that Europeans, specifically
Schrems, brought to court the case of data could be accessed by American
intelligence agencies implies to approach the problem from a completely
different angle to the traditional opposition between Europe and the U.S.
regarding privacy. The case has certainly made more accessible information
about the U.S. surveillance review in comparison to other parts of the world.
However, it should not be forgotten that the EU benefits to some extent
from the U.S. intelligence, if not as a whole, of course some of its Member
States. That cooperation should not be compromised. The system must be
improved, so that Europeans can bring a lawsuit in case of surveillance before
the U.S. courts. Although everything seemed resolved with the principle of
equality, when it was agreed that European citizens would have access to the
same redress mechanisms as Americans211 that promise is actually an empty
shell, taking into account that even American citizens themselves have no
207
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such possibility in the event of surveillance. What is being asked is not equal
rights but accommodation to the framework of fundamental rights that prevail
in the EU. This framework may not be exactly the same as the one that binds
the Member States by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),
since the EU Charter is only activated when EU law is applied or the Member
States implement EU law.212
Furthermore, the establishment of a higher level in European law is
also completely in accordance with the Charter. The wording of article 52 (3)
of the Charter establishes that the meaning and scope of Charter rights shall
be the same as those laid down by the ECHR, afterwards it clarifies “This
provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.”
Given the current regulation with the GDPR, it is clear that the
fundamental rights contained in the Charter cannot go unnoticed. The CJEU
is right in not mentioning any article of the ECHR whilst the Advocate
General considers that such regimes of interception of electronic
communications, even on a mass scale, are compatible with Article 8 (2) of
the ECHR provided that they are accompanied by a number of minimum
guarantees.213 Indeed, the leading interpretation was already held in Schrems
I. The express obligation under EU law to protect personal data reading in
light of Article 8 (1) of the EU Charter is intended to ensure that the high level
of that protection continues where personal data is transferred to a third
country.214 The fear of the CJEU was that without demanding an essentially
equivalent level of protection in the third country, EU law could be easily
circumvented.215
The Commission's experience in negotiating the SH and the
subsequent annulment by the CJEU could have prevented the outcome of
Schrems II. Yet the crucial point at this moment is solving a debate on
available remedies under surveillance laws.
The EU has been accused of being hypocritical under the premise that
some Member States do not have such limitations and safeguards with regard
to surveillance.216 Nevertheless, the topic is different because EU membership
presupposes that Member States comply with EU values and that makes them
beneficiaries of internal data flows. This was one of the great handicaps that
the EU faced long ago. However, it is not true that there is a double standard.
212
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What happens is that the CJEU focuses on the analysis of U.S. law because
the specific case concerns the Commission decision to transfer data from the
EU to the U.S. In the near future, this standard could be applied to any country
without an adequacy decision by the Commission. In fact, the validated use
of SCCs does not prevent this mechanism from being insufficient when the
recipient of the data cannot guarantee the same level of protection that the data
had in the EU.
Some DPAs have been quick to point out that data under the PS system
should not be transferred to the U.S. and that all transfers using the
Commission's SCCs should be reviewed.217 In the short term, a ban on data
from certain countries and specifically the U.S. could happen. It is not only a
legitimate reason, but it is worthy that personal data continues in the EU to
comply with legislation. However, the costs of implementing such a shortterm solution must be studied. The question that arises is whether this answer
is practical, considering that while large companies probably will not have
problems in the implementation (since they often operate under transnational
groups), small ones could face technical problems.
C. Lack of Effective Legal Remedies
i.

U.S. Law Developments Does Not Affect Surveillance
The very existence of effective judicial review is inherent in the
existence of the rule of law. The essence of Article 47 of the EU Charter is to
provide individuals to pursue legal remedies when their fundamental rights
are infringed. Recent U.S. developments concerning redress were not
mentioned by the CJEU whilst invalidating the Privacy Shield.
First, the U.S. Judicial Redress Act (JRA)218 extends to EU citizens
the judicial redress provisions in the U.S. Privacy Act of 1974. 219 Second, the
U.S. FREEDOM Act forbids bulk collection in national security matters 220. It
is claimed that the U.S. is the only country that has finished a bulk collection
program.221 However, these legal improvements only concern American
citizens.222
217
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Concerning the first legislative act, the JRA was considered a precondition to sign the U.S.-EU “umbrella” Data Privacy and Protection
Agreement. In principle, it extends to all data subjects in the EU the right to
enforce their data protection rights in U.S. courts, for instance, in case of
unlawful disclosure of records or for unjustified refusal to access data. 223
However, several exemptions make the JRA not useful for a
surveillance context. Citizens of covered countries are permitted to bring civil
actions against U.S. federal agencies and obtain civil remedies, but damages
only when intentional or willful conduct is shown.224 It excludes non-EU
citizens, for example, any natural person that is not a citizen of a covered
country, which is contrary to article 47 and 21 of the EU Charter. 225 Moreover,
it only applies for certain violations of the Privacy Act and there is no right to
restrict the collection of data, but rather a right to access, rectify and disclose
personal data. As JRA does not establish a right to minimize the collection of
surveillance data for U.S. citizens, they are not empowered to enforce it. In
the same way, the extension of no right to Europeans does not solve the
problem of redress in light of the EU Charter. Furthermore, in the case of the
Privacy Shield, the Attorney General may require to certify that the policies
for transferring personal data for commercial purposes of the country ‘do not
materially impede the national security interests’ of the U.S. 226 The approval
of the head of ‘designated Federal agency or component is needed. Thus, if
the head of the NSA does not concur, the NSA will not be a designated agency
and the JRA will not apply to it.227
Second, the FREEDOM Act makes changes regarding bulk collection
of phone records and the content of the FBI request. Stricter minimization
conditions applied for FBI access, retention and dissemination of personal
data.228 Moreover, the amicus curiae mechanism makes it possible for experts
to participate in the proceedings in front of the FISA court. However, the issue
with the FREEDOM Act is that the new protections refers to U.S. persons.
The CJEU notes that the Commission erred on the assessment about
judicial redress in the Privacy Shield Decision.229 Concerning unlawful
(electronic) surveillance for national security purposes, no effective judicial
223
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redress is mentioned. Therefore, PRISM and Upstream programmes based on
Section 702 of the FISA and those surveillance programs based on E.O. 1233
do not have an effective remedy because U.S. law does not grant individuals
actionable rights in the courts against the U.S. authorities.230 The Commission
Decision violates Article 47 of the Charter as the United States law does not
ensure a level of protection essentially equivalent to European law. Indeed,
the US Supreme Court did not grant standing to a group of plaintiffs claiming
that they were likely under surveillance and had to take expensive measures
to avoid that surveillance.231 The justification was they could only speculate
as to whether they were under surveillance, but did not prove it.
ii.

Lack of Independence of the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson
One of the essential elements of data protection is that requirements
stemming from Article 8(1) and (2) of the EU Charter are subject to control
by an independent authority.232 For instance, the Proposed Agreement on the
processing of Passenger Name Records between the EU and Canada did not
ensure the independence of the supervisory authority, because the language
used “an authority created by administrative means that exercises its functions
in an impartial manner and that has a proven record of autonomy” seems to
permit that the Canadian authority was subject to a subordinate relationship
and was not free from any external influence on its decisions. 233
The U.S. government created an Ombudsperson Mechanism as a
contact point for foreign governments that wish to raise concerns regarding
U.S. signals intelligence activities. According to Annex III to the Decision,
the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson is independent from the Intelligence
Community.234
However, the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson is not independent, as it
is an integral part of the U.S. State Department. In particular, the Privacy
Shield Ombudsperson is appointed by the Secretary of State and reports
directly to him. The CJEU points out that no additional safeguards come along
with the appointment, dismissal or revocation of the Privacy Shield
Ombudsperson.235 Additionally, the PS Ombudsperson does not have
authority to adopt binding decisions, which does not guarantee the conditions
230
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for an effective remedy in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter. 236 In
conclusion, the created mechanism does not afford EU citizens a level of
protection essentially equivalent to that guaranteed by the fundamental right
of an effective remedy.
D. No Legal Vacuum: Reduced Alternatives
The validity in abstracto of the Commission Decision 2010/87 is
separated from the inadequacy finding of a third country legal system.
However, both are correlated because data transferred for commercial
purposes between private companies that can be processed for the purposes
of public security, defense and State security by the authorities of that third
country remain under the scope of the GDPR.237
Binding corporate rules (BCRs) are a common mechanism to transfer
data among large corporations, when an adequacy decision is lacking. 238
However, BCRs are designed for a group of undertakings and are usually
costly to negotiate. Moreover, regarding the U.S. as a recipient country, BCRs
could suffer from similar consequences as SCCs after Schrems II.
The CJEU sends a strong message: there is no legal vacuum after
invalidating PS. Therefore, there is no will to maintain the effects of the
Privacy Shield decision for the purposes of avoiding the creation of a legal
vacuum, because according to its judgment, legal vacuum does not exist.239
Article 49 of the GDPR provides derogations for specific situations, like
explicit subject data’s consent or necessity for the performance of a contract.
In the case of consent of the data subject, the individual must have been
informed of the possible risks of such transfers for the data subject due to the
absence of an adequacy decision and appropriate safeguards by virtue of
article 49 (1)(a) of the GDPR. Hence, Schrems II will condition the used of
the consent exemption regarding transatlantic data transfers. 240
Recital 112 GDPR offers some examples of public interest reasons,
including the case of contact tracing for contagious diseases. The second
paragraph of art. 49 of the GDPR allows a transfer to a third country provided
that is not repetitive, concerns only a limited number of data subjects and is
necessary for the purposes of compelling legitimate interests pursued by the
controller. In this scenario, the controller should inform the data protection
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authority of the transfer and assess all the circumstances surrounding the
transfer.
Nonetheless, article 49 of the GDPR should work as a last resort
mechanism for transfers of exceptional nature because derogations should be
interpreted restrictively.241 The use of derogations per se does not imply in all
cases that the country of destination does not ensure an adequate level of
protection, and it does not ensure the opposite either. 242
According to the European Data Protection Board, derogations are for
specific situations that are exceptional, based on individual cases and cannot
be used for massive or repetitive transfers. 243 Recital 113 of the GDPR also
refers to not repetitive transfers, but does not exempt the controller from
providing suitable safeguards to protect fundamental rights and freedoms of
natural persons.
The Schrems II decision applies to all types of companies, regardless
of size and organization. Case-by-case assessment of circumstances is going
to be essential in practice. Not only the derogations from Article 49 of the
GDPR, but also the nature of the data and whether U.S. companies are
electronic communications service providers subject to Section 702 FISA or
if they are not electronic communications service providers, but rely on them,
for example, by storing data in the cloud. For instance, the EU-U.S. data
transfers could continue from a European micro-company dependent on the
flow of data to the U.S. because the U.S. recipient is not obliged under FISA
to possible access by U.S. authorities and the data being transferred relates to
health.
E. Further Consequences of Invalidating International Agreements
The invalidation of SH by the CJEU was seen as an obstacle to
commerce, but the question is why to endorse laws that are not enforceable.
The Privacy Shield has also been challenged under CJEU scrutiny. Indeed,
the Advocate General in the controversial decision of Schrems II clearly
considered that PS is not compatible with the EU legal order. However, he
suggested the Court not to rule on the PS and limit their judgment to the
Standard Contractual Clauses issued by the EU Commission. According to
him, the SCCs are compatible with data protection law and if companies use
241
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them as a ground to transfer personal data from the EU to the U.S., they are
safe with regard to the legality of the transborder mechanism used. The
practical issue is how a mechanism can be compatible as an alternative when
the international treaty—which supposes to guarantee data privacy—does not
afford an equivalent level of protection to the EU order. The inconsistency of
AG Opinion in Schrems II suggestion can only be explained by the difficult
balance that has to be struck between the current international commerce and
enforcement of data privacy principles. Safe Harbour principles were a
political-economic compromise to continue cross-border data flows and
Privacy Shield inherits the same character of being a negotiable instrument as
a voluntary mechanism for U.S. companies. The Schrems I judgement
influenced and accelerated reaching to the Privacy Shield agreement, but
some scholars rightly stated that perhaps temporary. Then, Privacy Shield
would have been like a patch waiting for new reforms in the U.S. on data
protection and intelligence power.
The CJEU decided that the party is over again and the invalidation of
PS did not come by surprise. The judgement represents a continuation of the
Court’s jurisprudence on the regulation of international data transfers,
although it does not follow in its entirety the non-binding opinion by the AG.
The Irish Data Protection Commission welcomes Schrems II judgement,
underscoring that the CJEU endorses the substance of the concerns expressed
by the Irish High Court and the Data Protection Commission, but pointing that
using SCCs as a valid transfer mechanism, many questions still remain
concerning the application of the SCCs to EU-U.S. data transfers. 244
Therefore, further and careful examination on a case-by-case basis is required.
Moreover, the Irish Data Protection Commission observes that a supervisory
authority could not suspend data transfers while an adequacy decision was in
force245 and offers its collaboration with the rest of supervisory authorities to
develop a common position for an effective implementation of Schrems II. By
contrast, the Berlin supervisory authority states that personal data may
generally no longer be transmitted to the U.S. as before until the legal situation
changes.246 Relocating services in the EU or in a country that offers an
adequate level of protection may be mandatory. Exceptions exist in the special
cases provided for by law, for instance when booking a hotel in the U.S.
The U.S. Secretary of Commerce has immediately expressed its
deeply disappointment with the European Commission’s adequacy decision
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underlying the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield.247 The U.S. approach seems to want
to “educate” the CJEU on U.S. national security data access laws and
practices, underlining that U.S. rules exceed European ones. From a practical
perspective, the Department of Commerce asseverates to continue with the
certification of the PS. It makes sense that the privacy principles are
maintained, because the lack of compatibility is due to a surveillance
mechanism that private companies cannot solve by themselves.
However, the consequences of the reasoning of the Court reach
beyond transatlantic partners. Requiring data controllers to evaluate if a thirdcountry offers an adequate level of protection when applying SCCs means
that they should have in-depth knowledge of a third-country legal order.
Likewise, as it was stated by experts when invalidating SH, non-democratic
governments would not qualify as an adequate protection, which would need
to re-examine every mechanism to transfer personal data beyond the EU.
On the one hand, a relevant country to look into is the UK. From 2021
the UK will not belong to the EU. The ruling could complicate reaching an
agreement after Brexit, considering the mass surveillance taking place in that
country. This judgment is an indicator of what EU data processors could do
to transfer data to the UK. Some ideas already on the table could be to encrypt
every data and to develop codes of conduct or certification mechanisms to be
used as legal basis for the data transfer together with binding and enforceable
commitments.248 However, this is an optimistic viewpoint because if
circumvention of the GDPR is not permitted, an adequate level of protection
in the third country would be needed. At least, with respect to data transfers
to the U.S., irrespective of the mechanism used, the lack of surveillance
limitations seems to be solved by amending domestic legislation. It would be
expected that the analysis in any other country, including the UK, would need
to pass muster the GDPR’s interpretation in light of the EU Charter.
On the other hand, to accommodate third country norms would be
challenging, in particular when law enforcement rules are not existent or
intricate to obtain.249
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CONCLUSION

Whereas privacy laws exist in a territory, citizens would naturally
think that they can be respected. If the EU advances data protection as a
fundamental right for their citizens and their personal data is out of control
when they use the internet, why do Europeans have rules that can be so easily
manipulated? If privacy is dead, why should legislators care about data
transfers? The answer could be that data privacy is a subjective concept,
difficult to prove harm individually but affecting every future step of an
individual life. Individuals have protection only through laws and
enforcement of laws. Competition is another area where tech giants are in
trouble, but it is precisely the abuse of their market dominant position that is
more prevalent and the lack of public and private enforcement would not be
good news for consumers. The absence of choice between companies in
relation to services have negative consequences for consumers. No data
privacy laws and lack of public and independent enforcement leave citizens
unarmed in the digital society.
Some authors have made an analogy of data protection dynamics in
2016 and the dynamics after the end of the Second World War. 250 Data
protection depend on normative commitments established in advance. 251 The
regulation of data privacy involves a relationship of power, that is why the
State gets involved. If laws like the GDPR provide EU residents with
“fundamental rights”, the lack of enforcement turns the Regulation and any
other binding agreement into worthless scraps of paper. The Sacramento
effect as a kind of privacy superregulator in the United States252 could be
considered a reaction of the EU data privacy model success in the marketplace
of ideas. The EU had shown bargaining power with flexibility,253 however,
flexibility that tends to build bridges cannot disadvantage European citizens
in a U.S. context when U.S. companies operate in Europe.
Reaching a solution will involve diplomacy. A transatlantic
interoperability is needed between languages and among cultures.254
Negotiations between authorities have shown that enforcing power in a
unilateral way is not an alternative. Both authorities have an interest in
enforcing their privacy laws in an extraterritorial manner. The final solution
will be to understand that data have a value in itself and that data protection
legislation must play its role. The problem is the surveillance society in which
250
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we are immersed. Governments must respect data protection and privacy as
human rights. The International Principles on the Application of Human
Rights to Communications Surveillance255 (2014) is a good start. Indeed, big
American tech companies very recently said that they would temporarily stop
processing requests from other governments for user data, which seems a
commitment with fundamental rights abroad. 256 Citizens must raise their
voice. Private society must convince and argue why our privacy is important
not only in the country of residence but also abroad. Finally, safeguards must
be in place to restrict government agencies’ access to private data of citizens.

255

NECESSARY & PROPORTIONATE, INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON THE APPLICATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS TO COMMUNICATIONS SURVEILLANCE (2014),
https://necessaryandproportionate.org/files/2016/03/04/en_principles_2014.pdf.
256
See Hadas Gold, Facebook, Google and Twitter won't Give Hong Kong Authorities User
Data for Now, CNN (July 7, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/06/tech/whatsa ppfacebook-hong-kong/index.html.
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